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INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a response to John Gardner’s article – “The Wrongness of Rape”.1 
It claims that Gardner is fundamentally or radically wrong; not by attacking 
his careful and well-constructed argument from the “inside” – by attempting 
to demonstrate some logical flaw in his argument – but by attacking his 
world-view. He shows us a world which simply does not accord with reality 
as perceived in our everyday lives by most, or all, of us. Whilst many 
philosophers, and certainly most philosophers of law, analyse the world in the 
way exemplified by Gardner, it is to be hoped that they reserve this analysis to 
their professional lives and do not make the mistake of thinking that it is 
connected with reality. For them reason prevails with emotion being relegated 
to the status of a mere “epiphenomenon”; whilst, for most of us, our 
emotional life is at least as important as our rational life. 
This article is an invitation to Gardner and others to make a “paradigm 
shift” in the sense proposed by Thomas Kuhn.2 Kuhn, in his explanation of 
the history of cosmology, showed how in order to explain the observed 
motion of the planets increasingly complicated systems of circular orbits were 
used (consisting of cycles, epicycles, epi-epicycles and so forth). These 
complex systems of orbits were used to explain the motion of the planets 
round the sun because people refused to believe that the planets could move in 
anything other than perfect circles. However, as the observational data grew, 
it became clear that no system of circular orbits, no matter how complex, 
could explain the observations. When Johannes Kepler advanced the work of 
Nicolas Copernicus, Tycho Brahe and Galileo Galilei and showed that the 
orbit of Mars could be best modelled by showing that it was elliptical, the 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Buckingham, Hunter St, Buckingham MK18 1EG. I 
am grateful to the anonymous reviewer, and to Professor Roy J Levin for clarification 
of the purposes of his research. I retain full responsibility for the opinions expressed 
in this article and for any and all errors. 
1 Herein references are to John Gardner, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’ in John Gardner, 
Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP 
2006). The original article was written by John Gardner and Stephen Shute; original 
bibliographic details are to be found in Offences and Defences.  
2 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U Chic P 1962). 
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problem was solved. Similarly, it is averred that no system of purely rational 
explanation, such as that advanced by Gardner, can explain the wrongness of 
rape. The explanation needs to start from a different position by explicitly 
including emotion in the explanation. 
Gardner’s relegation of emotion to a mere “epiphenomenon” (perhaps the 
prefix is telling) by trying to convince us that our emotional reaction to rape 
stems from its wrongness “as the mere use of a person” is unconvincing. The 
thrust of Gardner’s argument is Kantian. It may be summarised by saying we 
rationally assess rape as wrong because it involves the sheer use of a person 
for another’s end (that of the rapist) and sheer use violates the Categorical 
Imperative.3  
Daniel Statman, in his short article criticising Gardner’s analysis,4 points 
out that it is possible to “use” a person’s body in a number of ways which do 
not involve sex and claims that Gardner’s theory of rape is incomplete 
because it fails to give an account of why using a person is so much worse 
when that use is associated with sex.5 Statman gives an example of a medical 
student making use of a person’s body by creeping into her room whilst she is 
unconscious and examining her facial structure to revise for his examination. 
We might consider a dental student who crept in to examine a sleeping 
patient’s teeth in the same way. We would consider the dental student to be at 
moral fault, for putting gloved hands and dental instruments in a person’s 
mouth without their consent is reprehensible, but we would not consider him 
to be as evil as the man who crept in and raped his sleeping victim by oral 
penetration.6 We trust that the relevant competent professional bodies would 
not allow our trainee dentist to enter practice, but we would not expect the 
wrongdoers to be liable to life imprisonment under s 1 of the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 for the simple reason that it is not a sexual offence. It was a simple 
non-sexual assault and should be punished as such. The reason that rape is so 
much worse is purely and simply because of the emotional significance of 
sexual activity. We do not think of coition as a colourless act; coition is often 
called “making love” because of the central importance of love in our lives. It 
3 An alternative account of the wrongness of rape is to be found in John Stanton-Ife, 
‘Horrific Crimes’ in RA Duff and others (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law 
(OUP 2010). Stanton-Ife’s account claims that the wrongness of rape is to be found, 
not in a Kantian account (or as a transgression of the Millian harm principle), but as a 
transgression of the boundary which allows the victim to define herself as a person. 
The nature of that boundary is, it is judged, emotional and accordingly the account in 
this article equally answers Stanton-Ife’s points. 
4 Daniel Statman, ‘Gardner on the Wrongness of Rape’ (2012) 4 Jrslm Rev Leg Stud 
105, 10.  
5 Ibid 109.  
6 See Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1(a).  
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is here asserted, and the argument will be developed, that the epitome of 
human sexuality – the ideal or standard against which every sexual act is 
measured – is lovemaking and rape is, of course, the negation of lovemaking 
and it is thus an emotional crime. It is this point which must be explored and 
explained. 
 
1. THE STORY OF RAPE 
 
Gardner tells us a story about “pure rape” – a story which, as he may 
intend, offends and revolts us, and fills us with compassion for the victim. 
Gardner may, on the other hand, say that he simply wants to fill us with a 
sense of having observed wrongdoing and wants to provoke our rational 
outrage. This will not do, we simply are not like that. The point is explored 
below. 
In Gardner’s story his victim is raped whilst she is asleep; the rapist leaves 
no trace and he is killed immediately he has left her house. She is not harmed 
in any discernable way by the violation itself.7 The malefactor has been killed 
upon his exit, thankfully depriving him of the opportunity to, for example, 
publicly boast of his crime, or taunt his victim.8 Boasting or taunting would, 
of course, give rise to direct or indirect harms.9 Gardner’s story is effective 
but his analysis leaves out two important factors. 
The first exclusion is, of course, deliberate and central to his argument and 
is conceded here for, like Gardner, we are only interested in the wrongness of 
rape not in its harmfulness. Gardner excludes in “pure rape” any possibility of 
harm to the victim and so he has no need to analyse the issue. However this 
does not close the issue of “harmless rape”, but we must first introduce the 
second, more important, omission. 
The second exclusion from Gardner’s analysis is less obvious, but it is of 
the utmost importance. It is the partial exclusion of the reader; the fly on the 
wall asked to observe these events and to apply his/her moral evaluation to 
them. Leaving aside whether the reader may be a source of direct harm (“Do 
7 Whilst the victims were fully aware of the activities of Anigbugu and Hyung Woo 
Pyo, there are some common features between Gardner’s hypothetical rape and the 
real rapes discussed in Attorney-General’s References (No 73, 75 of 2010, and 03 of 
2011) (Michael Anigbugu and others) [2011] EWCA Crim 633. The differences, 
relating to the women’s knowledge of the offence, relate to the harms done. If there is 
any possible doubt about the harm occasioned by rape, this report is more than 
sufficient to dispel it. 
8 Gardner (n 1) 5; sets out the hypothetical harmless rape. 
9 For another fictional account of ‘sleep -rape’ (here induced by a drug) see Alison 
Greaves, 2022 (Saverge 2012) ch 27 and the emotional effect upon the victim of its 
later boastful disclosure in ch 34. 
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you know what that evil man did to you?”), or indirect harm such as gossiping 
leading to the loss of her reputation,10 the presence of the reader brings the 
entire analysis down. Gardner has not, of course, wholly excluded his readers; 
but he has placed them in a hopelessly narrow class; one might describe them 
as “the philosophy dons on the X5”.11 His readers are implicitly required to 
step inside his analysis and to abandon the normal human responses felt when 
a person is confronted with a story of rape. We feel empathy with Gardner’s 
hypothetical victim. As soon as we read of her plight our mind spills away 
uncontrolled. “Will she find out? What will happen when she finds out? What 
will she feel when she finds out?” We feel disgust, we feel outrage and we 
inwardly shudder for the victim. 
A possible answer to this rush of emotion would undoubtedly be to say 
“There, there, dear, dear, don’t worry yourself over this. Your emotions are 
just epiphenomena and, if you just calm down, you will see that you are 
rationally outraged by the wrongdoing and your emotional response is just 
empty sounding off.” The problem with this view is that it treats much of our 
personalities as a mere sideshow – a source of amusement or annoyance – 
whilst our rational minds get on with the (supposedly) Important Business of 
Running the Show. We therefore need to rehabilitate emotion and bring it 
back to its rightful place as a vital part of the human personality. 
 
2. THE REHABILITATION OF EMOTION 
 
The suppression of emotion is often pathological. Jonathan Glover has 
shown us how totalitarians suppress emotion in order to ensure that their 
operatives (paramilitaries, the “security services”, concentration camp guards 
and so forth) are able to perform their murderous functions.12 When emotional 
breakthrough occurred and the operatives realised the monstrosity of their 
actions they became unable to function. Glover cites, for example, 
circumstances in which the physical and psychological distance between 
guards and prisoners was diminished and concentration camp guards were 
unable to send women and children to the gas chambers.13 Glover also points 
10 Apparently a raped woman suffers loss of reputation see Youssoupoff v MGM 
Pictures (1934) 50 TLR 581. 
11 ‘The man on the Clapham omnibus’ is a shorthand for the ordinary reasonable 
person apparently introduced by Greer LJ in Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club 
[1933] 1 KB 205 (CA). The point is that Gardner’s readers do not appear to be 
ordinary. The X5 is a coach which covers the route between Oxford and Cambridge, 
perhaps it is used by philosophy dons. 
12 See Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century 
(Pimlico 2001). In particular see ch 35 ‘The Attack on Humanity’.  
13 Ibid 346-7. 
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out how in circumstances as diverse as the bombing of Cambodia in the late 
1960s, the (in)famous Milgram experiment, and the Cuban Missile crisis how 
an emotional appreciation of the situation did or could restrain people from 
committing savagery – where “emotional responses to the possible victims 
came alive”14 the aggressor stopped. Our emotional understanding of a 
possible victim’s situation acts as a powerful inhibitor upon our aggressive 
action. We judge the victim of rape by putting ourselves in her emotional 
position and feel compassion. We understand victims, whether of rape or, as 
in Glover’s examples, by our emotional reaction, not by reason alone. 
The sceptic here might say, “no we don’t torture people, murder them or 
rape them for purely prudential reasons. We do not want to be caught, we care 
what other people say about us, we do not want to invite retaliation.” These 
are all acceptable prudential reasons and are plainly reasons for (in)action. 
Alternatively we may start from Gardner’s position that these actions are 
wrong because, for example, they amount to the use of a person for our own 
ends and we rationally eschew wrongful action. Both of these objections 
appear to be valid. How can we answer them? 
Even when we are not dealing with the pathological suppression of 
emotion, it is abnormal to ignore our feelings. It is akin to cutting off half of 
our personality. How can we illustrate and understand this point? At this point 
Gardner’s own storytelling device becomes useful. Suppose that we look at 
stories of rape. If we deal with stories we may isolate our reaction and thus 
exclude prudential reasons against transgression. We may, of course still take 
Gardner’s view that the reason we feel ill after considering the stories is that 
we have judged the action to be wrongful and are feeling the effects of the 
epiphenomenon. This is doubted, but in order to consider the counterclaim we 
need to consider some stories of rape. 
It is possible that the most vivid and disturbing images of rape in 
mainstream film or theatre stop short of showing the actual penetration of the 
victim, but they are singled out by their emotional intensity. The rape of Irene 
Forsyte by her husband Soames graphically portrayed in the 1967 BBC 
television adaptation of John Galsworthy’s The Forsyte Saga was described in 
Nyree Dawn Porter’s obituary in the following terms: 
 
“The scene in which Soames Forsyte enforces his conjugal rights by 
raping Irene remains one of the most shocking episodes in television 
drama. At the time it was broadcast, it provoked a national debate 
about violence within marriage. ‘It was staggering how seriously it 
14 Ibid 408. 
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was taken,’ Nyree Dawn Porter recalled. ‘Politicians had televised 
discussions on whether Soames was right to rape his wife.’”15 
 
Thus a fictional, at two removes, account of rape has the potential to raise 
strong emotional reactions even where actual penetration is shown, the 
horrible effect can be intensified by the emotional setting. This occurs in the 
film A Clockwork Orange.16 It is judged that the conjunction of the romantic 
lyric from the Hollywood film Singing in the Rain17 amidst the physical and 
sexual violence of Alex and his droogs’ invasion of Home intensifies the 
emotional impact.18 The method of gaining entry to Home, by playing upon 
the sympathy of the inhabitants for a person supposedly lying injured outside, 
the use of comedy masks, and most importantly the use of “Singing in the 
Rain” together with the parody of dancing which amounts to that which 
Glover calls “a cold joke”19 shows how a story can evoke a strong emotional 
reaction.  
Now the scene has been set we need to perform some more rigorous 
analysis. Bruno Bettelheim points out that our highest achievement, or the 
attainment of psychological maturity, is the finding of meaning in our lives. 
He explains that wisdom (the understanding of what the meaning of one’s life 
may, or ought, to be) does not suddenly spring upon us, but is built up “small 
step by small step”.20 Whilst the purpose of his book The Uses of 
Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales explains the role 
of folk or fairy tales in the growth of children to psychological maturity, it is 
clear that since people do not live on fairy tales alone, that other sorts of story 
have an important place in building up an idea of “who do I want to be 
15 See the obituary in the Daily Telegraph of 12 April 2001, some 35 years after the 
first televising of the event. This is available at: ‘Nyree Dawn Porter’ The Telegraph 
(London, 12 April 2001)  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1315823/Nyree-Dawn-Porter.html> 
accessed 11 July 2014.  
16 ‘A Clockwork Orange - Singin in the Rain (Break-in Scene)’ (11 June 2008) 
<http://www.myvideo.de/watch/4409466/a_clockwork_orange_singin_in_the_rain_ 
break_in_scene> accessed 11 July 2014.  
17 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1ZyhVpdXbQ> accessed 11 July 2014. 
18 This point about the effectiveness of music as an emotional intensifier is made later 
in the story where Alex is inadvertently conditioned to be repulsed by music 
(including his favourite Ode to Joy from the final movement of Beethoven’s 9th 
Symphony) as he is conditioned by the Ludovico technique to refrain from violence.  
19 Glover (n 12) 36-7. Further examples are set out throughout the book. 
20 Bruno Bettelheim, The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of 
Fairy Tales, (first published 1975, Penguin 1991) 1. 
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like?”21 A story is an emotional rehearsal or an armchair walk-through of a 
situation. 
Soames Forsyte, and Alex and the malchiki serve a purpose useful to us in 
building up a picture of what it is like to be a rapist and affirming to us, as 
empathic beings who are hurt by another’s pain, that we certainly do not want 
to be like them. Thus when we hear even the word “rape” we, or at least those 
of us who are not rapists, immediately think of pain, degradation and 
suffering. We wish to have no part of it. In a sense the Ludovico technique 
applied to Alex in A Clockwork Orange is an artificial and brutal extension of 
that which occurs naturally in a person. Alex was forced to watch violent and 
sadistic films after being injected with drugs to produce nausea and physical 
revulsion; after repeated exposure to the combination he became conditioned 
and was revolted by such behaviour despite the fact that, in his earlier life, he 
had revelled in ultra-violence, the use of the bolshy kickboot and “the old in-
out” (ie rape). Most of us build up such revulsion naturally. Feeling (at the 
very least) queasy is, for most people, a natural reaction to stories of rape. 
In his work on fairy tales Bettelheim points out that, whilst in reality 
people are good and bad at the same time, fairy tales do not demonstrate this 
ambiguity so that children may more easily learn to tell the difference 
between good and bad character.22 Tales for adults are, of course, much richer 
in moral complexity because we have a much more supple moral imagination; 
we are able to appreciate that even Alex is not wholly and irredeemably bad. 
A Clockwork Orange facilitates our mental exploration of some difficult 
themes just as Gardner’s story of the harmless rape and, it is hoped, the stories 
herein allow us to explore wrongness from the comfort (for everyone) of our 
chairs.  
 
3. SOME STORIES OF SEX 
 
Assuming that the claim regarding the importance of stories as means for 
exploring not only the rational consequences of an action (the traditional 
philosophers’ “thought experiment”) but also the emotional effect of an event 
or series of events is broadly correct; here we are going to consider some 
stories of sexual intercourse. Since we are dealing with an emotional subject 
readers may find that the stories and the analysis are more explicit and deal 
more openly with sexual matters than is common in legal or philosophical 
analysis. This cannot be avoided when one deals with sexual crime. Gardner 
himself averts to this fact when he suggests that such analysis may be 
21 Ibid 10. 
22 Ibid 9. 
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“philosophically uncomfortable, not to say, unsafe”.23 This cannot be correct, 
thought cannot and should not avoid discomfort; the whole purpose of 
academic freedom is to discuss the uncomfortable and the “unsafe”. 
The stories are based upon Gardner’s original story. To facilitate writing 
and reading, let us call the woman “Mary” and the two men with whom, in 
various circumstances she has intercourse “John1” and “John2”. In the 
variations to this story John1 and John2 engage in other activities; but let us 
accept that they are the same Johns as in the first stories, but they have not 
had the prior experiences. The important thing to note is that the Johns vary in 
one important characteristic perceived by Mary. Since some of the facts are 
common to the stories we can reduce them to two tales by using the 
contraction John1/2 for the two men. Once we have set out the stories we can 
draw out the essential distinctions between John1 and John 2. A consideration 
of these stories will demonstrate the wrongness of rape and will show that the 
root of its wrongfulness is to be assessed by the emotional content of the 
stories. The presence of the necessarily empathic “fly on the wall” (the real 
emotional human being) is crucial to our understanding of wrongness. 
 
A. John1/2 enters Mary’s bedroom after she has taken a sedative 
which has the side effect of facilitating intercourse. Donning a 
condom he has intercourse with Mary and leaves. He is killed 
by a passing bus.  
B. Counterfactually John 1/2 who, for some reason, has intimate 
knowledge of Mary’s body and the inside of her house writes 
a tale on his tablet detailing his entry into Mary’s bedroom 
whilst she is asleep and his intercourse with her in explicit 
detail. The tale is wholly fictional, but his knowledge of her 
house and anatomy makes it entirely plausible. On his way to 
read the tale to her he is killed by a passing bus and his tablet 
destroyed. 
 
John1 is a tradesman whom Mary has met at the swimming baths whilst 
dressed only in her skimpy bikini. She needs some maintenance work done on 
the radiator in her bedroom. She engages John1 to perform the work. This 
knowledge is sufficient to allow John1 to enter Mary’s house whilst she is 
asleep and to describe her bedroom and her body in sufficient detail to 
accomplish the projects set out in story A and story B. If John1 had asked 
Mary to have intercourse with him she would have angrily refused. This 
explains story A – John1 raped Mary. 
In our story B if John1 were to read his tale to Mary, she would believe 
that she had been raped and would suffer all of the emotional harms 
23 Gardner (n 1) 2. 
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experienced by women who had been raped. Story B is analogous to 
Gardner’s story of the “harmless” or “pure” rape. The rapist’s victim in 
Gardner’s story has not come to any physical harm (physical trauma, 
pregnancy, sexually transmitted infection); the only possible harm she could 
have suffered is the horror of being raped. However just as we know that 
Gardner’s harmless rape was a story of wrongdoing, we are equally certain 
that John1’s threat to read the story of Mary’s rape to her is equally wrong. 
We are relieved that John1 was thwarted.  
John2 is Mary’s regular lover. She enjoys making love with John2; they 
have sex regularly and are contemplating marriage or some other long-term 
commitment. The events set out in story A were initiated by Mary; she is 
entranced by the fairy story The Sleeping Beauty24 and wishes to have John2 
make love to her whilst she is asleep.  
However it is here that Story B really comes into its own. Say that John2 
and Mary explain to our observer that Mary would find the tale erotic and that 
Mary wished to have John2 read her the tale as a prelude to making love. 
Whilst we may think that Mary and John are slightly “kinky”, we must accept 
that people do have fantasies about sex. Certainly one can find sexual fantasy 
all the way from Gilgamesh25 to the meretricious (in both senses of the word) 
Fifty Shades of Grey.26 This includes fantasies of domination and indeed use. 
The point of “use” is important for Gardner is claiming it is the “use” of 
another person which constitutes the wrong, Mary wants to be “used” in a 
controlled sense by John2 so that she feels no responsibility for that which has 
happened,27 whilst she would recoil in horror (and, incidentally, be harmed if 
she knew what John1 had done, or was planning). In some senses then, “being 
24 See, eg, Bettelheim (n 20) 225. 
25 NK Sandars (tr), The Epic of Gilgamesh (Penguin 1971). See, in particular, the 
story of Enkidu and Shamhat. 
26 EL James, Fifty Shades of Grey (Vintage 2011). Notwithstanding the plodding 
nature of the plot and the weak characterisation the book is a best–seller. This appears 
to be a popular genre of fiction for the category of ‘erotica’ within the fiction index of 
the popular bookseller Amazon UK, which seems to contain over forty thousand 
entries; Website accessed 11 July 2014.  
27 This point about rape or use fantasies is powerfully made by Nancy Friday in her 
My Secret Garden (Virago 1976) 108-109. Friday points out that some women 
fantasise (and the point that it is a fantasy cannot be too strongly emphasised) about 
rape as a mechanism for losing control and evading responsibility. Friday points out, 
in the strongest terms, that none of the women she interviewed would want to be 
raped in reality. 
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used” is not wrongful. Perhaps all sexual activity is, in some ways “being 
used”,28 and it is the emotional context of that “use” which is important. 
One can see the story of use in Pauline Réage’s L’histoire d’O.29 Here, in 
a story written by a woman,30 a fictional heroine voluntarily submits to sexual 
slavery. Similarly in Captive of Gor,31 a woman who is reduced to sexual 
slavery by extra-terrestrial kidnappers goes on to embrace her state of 
captivity,32 and comes to believe that she was chosen for slavery because of 
her psychological make-up. In both of these stories, it is the woman’s 
voluntary, subjection to some form of slavery which she then turns around to 
enslave, in a psychological sense, her enslaver.33 
28 The text which comes to mind as a poetic rendition of this fact is Juliet’s opening 
soliloquy from Act 3 Scene 2 of Romeo and Juliet, especially lines 12-16. 
29 Pauline Réage (pseudonym), L’histoire d’O (Corgi 1972). 
30 The precise identity of the author remains controversial. One view is that the author 
was Dominique Aury. See Geraldine Bedell, ‘I Wrote the Story of O’ The Guardian 
(London, 25 July 2004) 
 <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2004/jul/25/fiction.features3> accessed 11 July 
2014. It is also claimed that Dominique Aury is a further pseudonym for Anne 
Desclos, see ‘Story of O: All about Story of O, the French Erotic Novel by Pauline 
Reage’ (1 January 2011) <http://www.storyofo.info/index.html> accessed 11 July 
2014. It is clear that there are some differences between the book and Just Jaeckin’s 
cinematic rendition of the story but both highlight the emotional condition of O; 
possibly the emotional intensity of the film is increased by Pierre Bachelet’s 
atmospheric score. Even alternative musical arrangements of Bachelet’s theme have a 
strong emotional effect – for example Ramachandra Borcar’s (pseudonym Ramasutra) 
rendition on his 1999 album The East Infection. 
31 John Norman (pseudonym) The Captive of Gor (E-reads 1972). John Norman is, in 
reality, the philosopher John F Lange. Norman’s emphasis on the emotional state of 
his heroine as set out in the opening passage of the book accord with the emphasis on 
emotion displayed by the author of L’histoire d’O.  
32 It is instructive to consider the view of Robert Nozick on slavery here. Nozick 
argues in Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books 1974) 331, that a person may 
rightfully sell themselves into slavery. Could someone willingly become a ‘sex-slave’ 
and derive fulfilment from that status? One message - from L’histoire d’O, the 
Gorean sagas or Nancy Friday - might be ‘yes, but only as a matter of fantasy.’ Lange 
has been interviewed on this matter; see Charlie Jane Anders, ‘John Norman, the 
Philosophy Professor Who Created the Barbaric World of Gor’ (22 March 2011) 
<http://io9.com/5783833/john-norman-the-philosopher-who-created-the-barbaric-
world-of-gor> accessed 11 July 2014. Readers may care to heed Gardner’s warning at 
Gardner (n 1), text associated with (n 23). 
33 In Just Jaeckin’s film The Story of O, O and her master, Sir Stefan (or Stephen – it 
is unclear) fall in love. In the final scene O brands Sir Stefan (as she has been 
branded) with her initial using a lighted cigar. In Captive of Gor, the heroine’s captor 
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The importance of the stories of “O” and “Eleanor (or Elinor) Brinton” 
(the Captive of Gor) is not that people should be enslaved or that slavery 
should be seen as an acceptable mode of life but that the books should be seen 
purely as fantasy – as, in the sense described above and by Bettelheim, – fairy 
tales. That is to say ways of exploring the emotion of situations. Bettelheim 
has pointed out that in fairy tales intended for children, good and evil 
characters are sharply distinguished and polarised; fairies are either wholly 
good or wholly evil.34 Should we be surprised that in fantasies designed for 
adults the characters are more like ourselves – somewhat ambiguous? They 
are ways in which we can explore the emotional significance and meaning of 
being used. As we have seen we can observe the way in which this is 
emotionally satisfying even if we find it slightly odd. However, the reader or 
the person in the jury box, our arbiter of morality whom Gardner has omitted 
from his story, can readily tell the difference between Story B’s John1 and 
John2, as surely as s/he can see the difference between the Johns in Story A. 
How can these tales be theorized and brought to bear on an analysis of the 
wrongness of rape? 
 
4. MEANING, EMOTION AND EMPATHY 
 
Here is one explanation. Perhaps it is a little colourful, no apology is 
offered because the explanation itself illustrates an important point. Words are 
creatures of reason; they may not be best suited to an explanation of emotion. 
As Gardner himself points out the experience of rape may be better expressed 
by means of “drama, poetry, sculpture, and other more purely expressive ... 
media”.35 It may be that which is required of the reader is to “grok” the 
concepts expressed.36 A more measured explanation which refers to the 
philosophical, psychological and scientific literature follows.  
It is our common experience that sexual intercourse is the most highly 
emotionally coloured of our everyday actions. The culmination of intercourse 
– orgasm – has been studied at a physiological level and a working definition 
who has boasted that he never pays for a woman but always captures them, recaptures 
Elinor from a rival and, having made good his escape, voluntarily pays her price. 
34 See Bettelheim (n 20) 9. 
35 Gardner (n 1) 2. 
36 ‘Grok’ is the ugly (fictional) Martian word introduced by Robert A Heinlein in 
Stranger in a Strange Land (Hodder & Stoughton 1961). It’s meaning is explained as 
‘to understand intuitively or by empathy’. See the entry in the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (5th edn, OUP 2002). The present author’s assertion is that we do not need 
fictional Martians in order to understand intuitively or empathically; it is a 
fundamental human faculty. 
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containing a number of elements common to both males and females has been 
agreed: 
 
“An orgasm in the human … is a variable, transient peak sensation of 
intense pleasure creating an altered state of consciousness usually 
accompanied by involuntary rhythmic contractions of the pelvic 
striated … musculature, often with concomitant … contractions and 
myotonia … ending usually with feelings of … well-being and 
contentment”37  
 
Indeed. By a similar measure the Mona Lisa is the arrangement of 
pigment on canvas, David is a carved piece of marble, Im Abendrot or the 
Concierto de Aranjuez are just collections of sounds, and To his Coy Mistress 
and The Ecstacy are just words. 
We simply do not understand intercourse, still less making love or rape, or 
any of these works of art by simple, or even complex, rational explanations. 
No doubt an art historian could place Michelangelo’s masterpiece precisely in 
terms of its time and significance in the art of Europe and the world, but that 
would not be the point. Marvell and Donne, whatever their honoured place in 
literature, do not speak only to our rational minds; we understand them more 
fully on an emotional level. Marvell is particularly powerful in To his Coy 
Mistress where he calls to mind the power of love over death or is it death 
over love? His poem does not affect us solely or mainly at the level of reason. 
For that we would need complex statistical evidence relating the ages at which 
people retire from sexual intercourse, a description of the inactivity of corpses 
and the process of bodily decay after burial. Marvell’s words, and the 
emotions they inspire, have much more impact. Similarly we can make love 
without thinking of the “pelvic striated musculature” and probably do so 
without considering their “involuntary rhythmic contractions”. It is suggested 
that few of us would choose to make love with a person whose attention was 
fixed on the contractions of their muscles.  
37 Roy J Levin, ‘The Physiology of Orgasm’ in John P Mulhall and others (eds), 
Cancer and Sexual Health (Springer 2011) 36. This author’s ellipses within the text 
indicate the omission of gender-specific effects, such as the ejaculation of semen. 
Levin makes the point, in a personal communication, that the purpose of his research 
is therapeutic and the reductionism (of which the author may seem to accuse him) is 
not meant to diminish the significance of emotion in making love. That is not the 
author’s point, and no criticism of Levin is intended. Even when we are able to 
provide a molecular account of love (or other emotions) we will still understand them 
best by raw submersion in their effects rather than by titrating some neurotransmitter. 
The author feels (or groks) that Levin acted kindly in providing explanation of his 
work in a way which subsumes whatever neural connections are made in his brain. 
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Our emotional engagement with Mary’s situation depends upon our 
correct perception of the situation. Either she is being raped and we feel 
revulsion or she is engaged in some slightly kinky sex game and, whilst we 
may not wholly approve of the antics of John2 and Mary, we are likely to feel 
happy for them. Assuming that we have some sexual experience, and thus 
know about the “variable transient peak sensation of intense pleasure creating 
an altered state of consciousness”, and the “feelings of well-being and 
contentment”, we might well like to think of an alternative story in which 
John2 safely arrives at Mary’s house, reads her the (fictional) story and then 
they make love. As the stories have shown we may “slide” up and down the 
scale of acceptability by considering our emotional reaction to Mary’s 
treatment. At one end of the spectrum we experience a mixture of nausea, 
outrage, revulsion and sympathy for Mary when we consider that she has been 
raped (or believes herself to have been raped); whilst at the other we feel a 
warm glow and hope that John2 and Mary will find lasting love. Perhaps this 
emotional state is related to the feelings of well-being and contentment we 
experience after intercourse; the important point being that these feelings are 
mutually induced by the shared activity of lovemaking and we measure 
another’s experience by our own, real or imagined, emotional standard.38 It 
cannot be doubted that emotional engagement is constitutive of lovemaking 
(as opposed to, say, paid-for prostitution) and, if we are engaged by a story, 
whether as a reader of fiction or because we are hearing it from the jury-box, 
we put out our “emotional tentacles” to make contact with the person we are 
hearing. Whilst in the jury-box we have the added complication of 
ascertaining whether the victim is telling the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth about her experience; we weigh the experience of rape in general (as 
opposed to a particular instance) in emotional scales. Gardner’s article is 
about the wrongness of rape as a phenomenon rather than about the forensic 
analysis of a particular incident and here we are engaged in a similar 
enterprise. We are not concerned with Mary’s rape or her lovemaking, we are 
concerned whether rape is wrong and why it is wrong. We are “reaching out 
to” or “becoming part of” the community of rape victims or lovemakers 
through exercising our empathy or emotional imagination – to use Heinlein’s 
ugly neologism for something which is well-understood by us as humans - 
“grokking”. Whilst the emotional space occupied by those making love is, 
without doubt, the easiest to reach for most of us, we have all experienced 
38 See eg, Jakob Eklund, Teresia Andersson-Straberg and Eric M Hansen, ‘“I’ve Also 
Experienced Loss and Fear”: Effects of Prior Similar Experience on Empathy’ (2009) 
50 Scand J Psychology 65.  
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intense emotional pain at some time in our lives and we can imagine (even if 
dimly) that pain sliding over into the emotional experience of rape.39  
We now turn to a more orthodox explanation of the position. The general 
theme of the analysis herein is based on David Hume’s assertion that reason is 
the slave of the quiet passions.40 This is taken to mean that our first evaluation 
of an occurrence, such as rape, is emotional rather than rational. However 
Hume wrote this in the eighteenth century and one might say simply that 
Hume is entitled to his opinion, which is fully consistent with the remainder 
of his philosophical works and in the same way Gardner is entitled to his 
view. It is certainly not sufficient to found a successful radical challenge to 
Gardner’s work. The Gardnerian / Kantian would simply say that the author 
has provided an alternative (and erroneous) view.  
Some support for this alternative view is given by the work of Michael 
Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman in Valuing Emotions where they further 
articulate the view that emotions are central to human personality and often 
provide the foundation of value.41 They opine that emotion is fundamental. 
However, if Hume is correctly taken as suggesting that at the bottom of our 
thought emotion and reason are so deeply entwined such that he merely thinks 
that passion is prior to reason because reason itself does not and cannot act as 
a motivating power, we are left in a position where we simply have to 
arbitrarily choose between emotion and reason. 
To clarify: the Gardnerian would say rape is wrong because using another 
person as a means to an end is wrong and we react emotionally to the 
wrongness. 
A person taking the position set out here would simply say rape is wrong 
– it is horrifying, disgusting, vile, on a visceral, emotional level – it freezes 
our hearts. One might even say that reason is the true epiphenomenon  
What we would need to be able to decide between these two positions is 
some means of showing that a person could, in some circumstances, reason 
out a course of action but, because of some defect of emotion, could not act 
upon it. Such a person would conclude that rape was an egregious example of 
using a person to one’s own end (sheer use) and that if this action was 
universalised everyone would be used as a means and there would be no 
“kingdom of ends” … and then go on to question – what would be wrong with 
that? There is some evidence that people of this sort do exist. This is 
39 We could even, if we wished, share the emotional world of Alex DeLarge or John1, 
but it is to be hoped that we lack the emotional repertoire. If the interpretation of 
Bettelheim is correct we have decided that we do not want to be the kind of person 
who rapes another. 
40 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (first published 1738, OUP 1978). See 
Book 2 Section III Subsection III ‘Of the Influencing Motives of the Will’.  
41 Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (CUP 1996). 
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illustrated by the work of Antonio Damasio whose work in experimental 
psychology demonstrates the importance of emotion in action.42 Damasio 
examines the lives of two people afflicted by brain lesions in the part of the 
brain which produces emotional behaviour.43 Damasio’s examples – Gage and 
Elliot44 – are able to perform extremely complex rational tasks and formulate 
rational plans of action which, because of their inability to act emotionally 
they are unable to evaluate and put into action. Elliot, in particular, continued 
to reason himself into situations which required meticulous planning only to 
be unable to decide how to act. This type of injury seems to illustrate the truth 
of Hume’s hypothesis that emotions are the driving force of human 
personality. However it does not seem necessary to go quite this length to 
illustrate the fact that people manage to reason themselves into positions 
which are emotionally repellent.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The argument in this article is that, far from emotions being 
epiphenomena which follow on behind our rational assessment that rape is 
wrong because it is a sheer use of another person, emotions are right at the 
forefront of our assessment of wrongdoing. Even though the story of rape 
which Gardner recounts is one in which harm is expressly precluded, feelings 
of disgust and outrage are still evoked in the reader. We find the act of rape 
vile. However if we retain the element of sexual use, but place it in 
circumstances in which the person wants to be sexually used, we can reverse 
the entire sense of the story and, even though we might find it rather kinky we 
can empathise with our lovers. 
It is helpful to summarise the main differences between the positions, as 
they are understood by the present writer, taken by Gardner, Statman, 
Stanton-Ife and the writer. 
Gardner’s position is that rape is wrong because it is an example of the 
sheer use of a person. Our emotional reactions to rape stem from its 
wrongfulness. 
Statman observes that there are gradations of “sheer use” and that 
Gardner’s account fails to explain why rape is any worse than, eg, a secretive 
and unwanted oral examination. He points out that sexual behaviour is at the 
root of the distinctive repulsiveness of rape. 
42 Antonio R Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain 
(Avon 1995). 
43 As is clear from the title, part of Damasio’s work consists of an attack upon 
Cartesian dualism, Damasio shows that the mind has a physical cause and existence - 
the brain. 
44 See Damasio (n 42). In particular Part One of the book.  
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Stanton-Ife points out that rape (and other crimes) are destructive of 
personality itself rather than simply the use of a person. 
The present author argues that our emotional evaluation of an act is 
fundamental to our understanding of it. As observers we react differently to 
stories of people being happily used or abused. Key to our evaluation of this 
use or abuse is our emotional empathy: we feel warm or sick. The wrongness 
of rape stems from our natural emotional nausea and from there we proceed to 
label it as wrong. We may subsequently adopt a variety of accounts to 
rationalise our feelings - Gardner’s is but one well-articulated example. 
The idea that the earth (or, in later cosmologies, the sun) was the centre of 
the universe perfectly circled by the planets comes from a time in which the 
laws of the universe, both physical and human, were thought to have been 
ordained by a god. This god’s laws were, of course, wholly rational and 
perfect. Now we know otherwise, it may be time to accept that the 
irrationality of emotion is sufficient foundation for identifying some kinds of 
wrong. It is possible that we could trace the origin of the wrongness in those 
crimes which we identify as mala in se to no more than those things which we 
find to be emotionally repellent. This conclusion may be surprising to some 
because since early times philosophers have held the view that reason is the 
highest form of thought; perhaps it is now time to trust our unique emotional 
nature a great deal more.  
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